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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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2635th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 12 December 1985, at 11.25 a.m.

President: Mr. Léandre BASSOLE (Burkina Faso).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2635)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyrpus (S/17657 and Add.1 and 2).

The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/17657 and Add.1 and 2)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Austria, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the debate, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Türkmen (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Fischer (Austria) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to recall that in the course of the Council's consultations members agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Özer Koray in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Koray in accordance with rule 39. At the appropriate moment I shall invite Mr. Koray to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

3. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 June to 30 November 1985 in documents S/17657 and Add.1 and 2, dated 30 November, 9 December and 11 December 1985, respectively. Members also have before them a draft resolution contained in document S/17680, which has been prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

4. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution. Unless I hear any objection I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 578 (1985)].

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is the representative of Austria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

6. Mr. FISCHER (Austria): First, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for December. I am confident that you will guide the Council's proceedings in a constructive manner. I should also like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Woolcott, the representative of Australia, Austria's neighbour in the United Nations, for the exemplary way in which he conducted the Council's work last month.

7. Our request to be allowed to participate in the debate after the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on behalf of all the troop-contributing countries—Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom—was the result of careful deliberations.

8. The purpose of this statement is to address the question of the financial situation of UNFICYP, which is a source of deep concern to the Governments of the troop-contributing countries. The widening gap between the level of voluntary contributions and the real costs of this important peace-keeping operation places an ever heavier burden on our countries. The troop-contributing countries have always borne a large portion of the expenses of

UNFICYP. They have done so because they consider their participation in UNFICYP as a special service to the international community.

9. With the mounting deficit of UNFICYP, however, resulting in totally unsatisfactory rates of reimbursement, the share of the costs borne by troop-contributing countries has become disproportionate and, we believe, unfair. In this situation our Governments have directed a special appeal to Member States to make every effort to alleviate the serious financial situation confronting UNFICYP. We have requested them to increase their contributions or to begin making contributions if they have not done so before. The same request has been made by the Secretary-General, and we are grateful for his continuous efforts.

10. Peace-keeping operations are in the interests of the entire international community. Every Member State has a stake in the continued effectiveness of this essential instrument to safeguard international peace. We cannot ignore the fact that a sound financial basis is an important element for the viability of peace-keeping operations. On the occasion of the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP the troop-contributing countries reiterate their appeal to all Member States to demonstrate their solidarity and to increase their efforts to improve the financial situation of UNFICYP. We also wish to express our appreciation to those Governments that over the years continue to contribute regularly to UNFICYP.

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Cyprus, upon whom I now call.

12. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the high office of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December and to express appreciation for the skilful manner in which you have conducted the consultations on the draft resolution that has just been unanimously adopted, renewing the mandate of UNFICYP for another period of six months. It is a source of great satisfaction to my Government that the presidency of this important organ of the United Nations is in the talented hands of a worthy and distinguished representative of Burkina Faso, a very friendly country with which we share the closest of diplomatic relations, especially within the United Nations and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. May I add my personal felicitations and say that, knowing your diplomatic experience and your friendly and human touch, I conclude that your presidency augurs well for the Council and its important tasks. I also extend my warmest congratulations to your predecessor for the month of November, an outstanding diplomat, Mr. Richard Woolcott of Australia, whose wise and impeccable leadership has already been acknowledged by the Security Council.

13. I thank the members of this body for giving me the opportunity to address the Council. The renewal of the peace-keeping mandate of UNFICYP, to which my Government had given its consent, is, in the circumstances, imperative, owing to the continuing military occupation of part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey's non-compliance with a host of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, as well as the ongoing peace-making initiative of the Secretary-General, to the success of which we attach great importance.

14. The members of the Council are aware that, as a result of the 1974 invasion, almost 37 per cent of our territory remains under Turkish occupation, 200,000 Cypriots have been uprooted from their homes and lands and rendered refugees in their own country and hundreds are missing; and the loss in property is staggering. Our people, who lived intermingled for centuries, have been segregated by blood and iron on the basis of ethnic background.

15. Artificial barriers, *apartheid* policies and attempted secession depict the present grim state of affairs in the occupied areas. A scheme is promoted by Turkey in order to destroy the cultural character and heritage of Cyprus by desecrating and looting churches, some a thousand years old, as well as other places of worship; by looting ancient monuments and treasures; and by changing historical names of towns, villages and places in the ruthless pursuit of total Turkification of the occupied areas. This policy is coupled with the crime of mass importation of settlers to usurp the homes and properties of the expelled Greek Cypriots, with the objective of changing the age-old demographic character of Cyprus. Illegal and sham "elections", the adoption of a so-called new constitution, actions which are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and in flagrant violation of United Nations resolutions and the very initiative of the Secretary-General—those are some of the illegalities being pursued, even more arduously since the premeditated undermining of the high-level meeting of 17 January 1985.

16. Encouraged by the seeming inability of the world Organization to force Turkey to comply with solemn Security Council resolutions and decisions, Ankara is seeking to complete its unlawful intentions against Cyprus by striking at its territorial integrity and by creating a puppet régime maintained in power by the bayonets of the occupying army.

17. Disregarding the demands in the relevant United Nations resolutions and declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement for complete demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey has recently stepped up its militarization of the occupied areas by completing a major air base in the occupied area of Lefconico, and it is now nearing completion of a naval base in occupied Kyrenia. That is yet another attestation of contempt for the United Nations and an indication of a ruthless determination to perpetuate Turkey's military presence in the island. The size of the installations and the magnitude of the costs should give rise to serious concern as to their true purposes and uses.

18. In stark contrast to Ankara's continuous militarization is my Government's written acceptance of military deconfrontation of the area of Nicosia as proposed by the Force Commander in paragraph 17 of the Secretary-General's latest report.

19. The United Nations resolutions on the question of Cyprus reflect the consensus of world opinion. These are mandatory decisions. They demand the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus and the return of all refugees to their homes and lands in safety. They further demand respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus and non-interference and intervention in its affairs; they call for respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots, including, of course, freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and ownership of land. They further call for the withdrawal of the declaration of secession, the condemnation of all secessionist acts and the non-recognition of the illegal entity. I need not remind the Council that Turkey cast an affirmative vote for General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was subsequently endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974) and rendered mandatory.

20. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the record of Turkey towards the United Nations and the implementation of these resolutions have been dismal. Up to now, not a single refugee has been allowed to return to his home. As a matter of fact, the contrary is true. Considering that over 20,000 Greek Cypriots had remained in the occupied areas right after the 1974 Turkish onslaught, these unfortunate victims of the cruelty of Attila were forced gradually to abandon their ancestral homes and seek refuge in the government-controlled areas.

21. But what about the Security Council demands for withdrawal of the attempted secession and an end to the Turkish occupation, as well as the need for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms? Total disregard and absolute non-compliance by Ankara. As a matter of fact, each day that passes, new steps are taken by Turkey to consolidate its stranglehold over its small victim by way of new illegalities in the areas controlled by the Turkish army, contrary to United Nations resolutions and Ankara's own assurances given to the Secretary-General.

22. I am sure that the members of the Council do not view as serious the fallacious arguments of Turkey that these illegal acts emanate from the Turkish Cypriots, who allegedly administer the occupied areas. It is the Turkish army that runs everything. It was so recognized by the European Commission of Human Rights, which found Turkey guilty of mass violations of human rights in Cyprus. Whenever and wherever it chooses, the army intervenes in controlling—suppressing, rather—the Turkish Cypriots from whom it demands absolute obedience. There is one soldier for every four civilians, and if we add the settlers brought by Ankara from Anatolia there are two Turkish mainlanders for every four Turkish Cypriots. This militarization and saturation of the area with mainland Turks frustrates any independent policy or action by the Turkish Cypriot community, which in fact is under occupation and thus unable to negotiate freely, as required by United Nations resolutions. The presence of the Turkish troops poses an insurmountable obstacle to genuine negotiations, for nobody can negotiate freely under the barrel of the gun.

23. The expansionist policies of Turkey against Cyprus and its people explain the positions taken by the Turkish Cypriot community through the various rounds of the intercommunal talks on the initiatives of the Secretary-General and in accordance with the provisions of United Nations resolutions demanding the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Cyprus. Indeed, contrary to repeated assurances by Turkey, some of them in this forum, we now face a situation whereby Turkey and Mr. Denktaş dare openly admit that their position has been and will continue to be that the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces is non-negotiable and that the Turkish troops will remain in Cyprus in perpetuity.

24. These statements make a mockery of the words of Mr. Günes, Foreign Minister of Turkey at the time of the invasion, and recent statements by Mr. Kirca, former representative of Turkey to the United Nations, in the Security Council that "the Turkish armed forces will remain on the territory of the Federated State until the conclusion of the final agreement between all the parties concerned" [*see 2405th meeting, para. 116*].

25. It should be stressed in this respect that the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions call for the immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops. That is the solemn demand of this body. No qualifications exist for their withdrawal, other than that it has to be immediate. Thus, by the Turkish insistence on the pretext of effective protection, the international community, including the Greek Cypriot side, is asked to accept something which is contrary to the provisions of the relevant Assembly and Council resolutions. These Council resolutions are mandatory, binding on all Member States, on the Secretary-General himself and of course on the aggressor and its victim.

26. As if all that did not constitute enough evidence of the hardening of the Turkish positions, a further undermining of the initiative of the Secretary-General is now promoted by the Turkish side through certain statements which block future implementation of the three freedoms, namely, those of movement, of settlement and of ownership of land. That, in fact, amounts to a negation of the right of the people of Cyprus—irrespective of ethnic background—to move about freely in their own country, after a solution is reached.

27. These Turkish positions, while violating internationally accepted principles of human rights, are also contrary to the letter and the spirit of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, particularly Council resolutions 365 (1974), 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), which not only provide for the return of all refugees to their homes in safety but also safeguard the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots.

28. The Turkish insistence, on the other hand, that even after an agreement is reached Turkey should maintain its military presence in the island, in spite of the aggression it has committed against the Republic of Cyprus, amounts to forcing the victim of an assault to employ the protective services of the attacker.

29. There were also repeated statements to the effect that the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, being an "independent State", is entitled to enter into treaties with or seek recognition by other States. The creation of a central bank, which we have exposed in past meetings of this forum as a separatist and partitionist act, and the recent announcement that the bank will begin shortly to issue currency are in line with the scheme of so-called separate independence. I shall not refer to the assurances given again in this body, after the announcement of the creation of a so-called central bank in 1982, that it could not be a separatist act since the most important element of a central bank, that of issuing currency, was lacking. Nor shall I elaborate on the now-ludicrous argument advanced by Turkey, right after the attempted secession of November 1983, that the sole aim of Mr. Denktaş was simply to create a component State of a Federal Republic in Cyprus; I need not do so, since the sinister partitionist and annexationist designs of Turkey are by now clear to all.

30. I shall revert again, however, to the illegality of this offspring of aggression, the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This puppet has no territory of its own other than the areas occupied by the Turkish troops, the latter having only recently uprooted the indigenous Greek Cypriot community, constituting 82 per cent of the population in the areas, and having implanted thousands of settlers from the mainland of Turkey in the homes and lands of those expelled. To hear, therefore, the representatives of Turkey speak in the forums of the United Nations of the need for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is to witness the epitome of absurdity, amounting to a tragic irony of Aeschylean proportions. The right to self-determination, as provided in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), is to be exercised by the people as a whole, and not separately by factions, religious sects, communities or ethnic groups. One can only wonder what the world map would look like if the Turkish way of viewing things were to be accepted. It would be very interesting also to see how Turkey itself would be dismembered, in application of this doctrine.

31. The right to self-determination cannot be exercised on a part of the territory of Cyprus, which is controlled through force of arms by the Turkish military occupying forces, inasmuch as the Republic of Cyprus has *de jure* jurisdiction over this area, as confirmed by a host of United Nations resolutions. Thus, the so-called referendum for a new constitution of the secessionist self-proclaimed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and the so-called elections held in the occupied areas on 5 May and 9 June 1985 are without any legal standing and constitute a mockery of all democratic principles and a violation of international law and universally recognized concepts of human rights.

32. The Turkish insistence on the perpetual presence of the occupation troops in Cyprus not only is contrary to all United Nations resolutions but undermines the hopes for success of the Secretary-General's initiative. The people of Cyprus demand peace and an end to their ordeal. But they are not willing to settle for anything less than peace with justice and freedom, which will allow them to return to their ancestral homes. This means no foreign armies, no dividing lines and no meddling in their internal affairs.

33. As my President stated yesterday, a basic pre-condition for the solution of the problem of Cyprus is the end of occupation—which means the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the Republic of Cyprus before the establishment of an interim Government.

34. As regards Addendum 1 to the Secretary-General's report on his good offices, I should like to state the following.

35. As always, our side has co-operated constructively with the Secretary-General in his current initiative, which began in Vienna in August 1984 and continued with the proximity talks, the high-level meeting and the meetings at a lower level. We shall continue to do so.

36. At the same time we think that we should remind members of the Security Council of the following. After the high-level meeting failed to produce results because of the persistent refusal of Mr. Denktaş to engage in a meaningful dialogue and his rejection of all efforts to reach a compromise, we accepted the Secretary-General's idea for a new high-level meeting. Mr. Denktaş not only did not accept or co-operate, but proceeded instead with a series of illegal acts aimed at entrenching the invalid unilateral declaration of independence that he had been called upon by the Security Council to withdraw and rescind.

37. After Mr. Denktaş similarly rejected a suggestion by the Secretary-General for a joint lower-level meeting, we accepted in the same spirit of compromise another idea put forward by the Secretary-General for separate meetings with the two sides. Several meetings between the Secretary-General or his colleagues and our side were held, including meetings with the President and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus, and as a result we arrived at the April documentation, which was described in the Secretary-General's report of 11 June 1985 [*S/17227/Add.1*] as the formula most likely to lead to a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

38. Thus, in less than two months we reached a complete agreement with the Secretary-General, and in the process—and this is well known—we came well within reach of the safety line that demarcates the boundaries between a just and viable solution and a solution that would not be consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the norms of international law, including the minimum standards applicable to fundamental freedoms and democratic rights.

39. The Secretary-General is well aware of our position. Hence, we have no doubt that in deciding on his next step, and with his usual fairness, he will be acting accordingly.

40. In a parallel effort, the Secretariat has for the past eight months been trying to obtain an affirmative reply on the documentation from the Turkish Cypriot side. As early as last June the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the Turkish side had not yet made known

its position on the efforts he had undertaken since January and that he was awaiting its response. The response that the Secretary-General received from the Turkish side months later was, to use an understatement, not positive, and apparently it maintains the same posture to date.

41. All that is needed, therefore, is to persuade the other side to reciprocate our good will by accepting the April documentation as it stands, or in consolidated form, thus paving the way to substantial negotiations and speedy resolution of the Cyprus problem. It is our firm belief that the members of the Security Council, as well as the whole membership of the United Nations, could greatly assist the Secretary-General in obtaining such results.

42. For its part the Government of Cyprus is anxious to reach a negotiated settlement of the problem. It is our most firm belief that the people of Cyprus as a whole stand to benefit from an end to the almost 12 years of military occupation of part of our national territory. Through a just and lasting solution all the people of Cyprus will be able to enjoy once again the blessings of peace and of unimpeded freedom to move and to reside all over the island. Those aspirations of our people and their yearning for the blessings of justice, peace, co-operation and happiness in a Federal Republic of Cyprus are in accord with the relevant United Nations resolutions, the declarations of non-aligned countries and of the Commonwealth and the high-level agreements.

43. In a gesture of good will the Cyprus Government has refrained for the past three sessions of the General Assembly from insisting on a debate on the question of Cyprus. We have done so in order to allow the initiative of the Secretary-General to proceed smoothly. We must not, however, be expected to be the only side which responds to the Secretary-General's suggestion for a moratorium. As we have stated before, our hopes for vindication and justice rest on the United Nations, which constitutes the cornerstone of our foreign policy and the framework within which, we feel, a just and lasting solution of our problem can be found.

44. We are striving to secure implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions, to make Cyprus an island without foreign armies or dividing lines and to rebuild the bridges of co-operation blown up by foreign interference and intervention and by chauvinistic forces of division and confrontation.

45. The Government of Cyprus reiterates its unreserved support for the most commendable efforts of the Secretary-General in the framework of his personal initiative in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. In this respect, I express to him our deepest appreciation of his untiring efforts in seeking a peaceful and just solution to the problem of Cyprus.

46. We commend warmly the valuable and significant contribution of the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Brian Urquhart. His great and meaningful contribution to the United Nations by staunchly defending the purposes and principles of the Charter and labouring to enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the world Organization elevate him to the highest point of distinction for international contribution. Cyprus wishes him well and thanks him warmly for what he has done for its people. We also warmly appreciate the valuable contribution of the Secretary-General's close assistants, Mr. Feissel and Mr. Picco, in their continuous efforts to advance the cause of peace in our country. I pay a special tribute to Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, for the efficient manner in which he pursues his difficult mission.

47. My Government's deep appreciation goes also to Major-General Greindl, Commander of UNFICYP, and to his officers and men for the dedicated manner in which they continue to carry on the duties entrusted to them by the Security Council. In referring to UNFICYP, I should of course like to express our warmest feelings of gratitude and appreciation to all the friendly Governments which, through voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, have enabled UNFICYP to continue to render its indispensable peace-keeping services in Cyprus.

48. Before concluding, I should like to express the hope that the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus will proceed urgently with its humanitarian task of ascertaining definitively the fate of the hundreds of missing. This is a moral obligation which we owe to their families.

49. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Greece, upon whom I now call.

50. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on the assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of December. I am certain that, with your well-known tact and diplomatic experience, you will ably carry out your difficult task. It would be remiss of me if I failed to take this opportunity to thank the President of the Council for November, the representative of Australia, Mr. Woolcott, for the really exemplary way in which he guided the Council.

51. The representative of Cyprus has dealt extensively with many facets of the Cyprus problem. On the occasion of today's Council meeting, I should simply like to reiterate certain fundamental positions of my Government regarding the continuing occupation of northern Cyprus by the Turkish army. In other words, I should like to address one of the most substantive aspects of the Cyprus question.

52. Apart from Greece's special relationship with the people of Cyprus, the interest of my country stems also from the fact that it is one of the guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus. My Government remains unswervingly convinced that no solution to the Cyprus question can be envisaged as long as it does not provide for the withdrawal of the Turkish army from the island before any transitional machinery is set up in the Republic in accordance with an eventual agreement. Furthermore, a system of effective guarantees should be agreed upon. The agreement should fairly allay the fears of the Turkish Cypriot community that its rights might be abused by the Greek Cypriot community. It should equally protect the over-

whelming Greek Cypriot majority of the island and effectively safeguard the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus against any further Turkish threats.

53. As far as the security of the Turkish Cypriot community is concerned, this goal could be achieved convincingly through workable constitutional guarantees and an extension of the presence of UNFICYP under a new mandate for a substantial period of time. This arrangement has been repeatedly proposed both by President Kyprianou and by Prime Minister Papandreou.

54. As far as the security of the Greek Cypriot majority is concerned, the withdrawal of the Turkish army would be a positive development. Allow me, in this respect, to quote from a major foreign policy statement delivered by Prime Minister Papandreou before Parliament on 6 December: "We cannot accept a transitional period, a provisional Government, before the last Turkish soldier has withdrawn and the occupation of Cyprus is ended." And he added: "If Turkey becomes a guarantor Power we will not agree to become a guarantor Power as well . . . our proposal [Greece's proposal] is to have guarantees from a group of States from East, West and the third world."

55. The rationale behind this statement is more than obvious. It would be unwise and dangerous for Greece to guarantee a solution which not only might prove constitutionally unworkable but which would also provide for the presence of the Turkish army in the island under one form or the other—and allow me to stress most particularly this last point. Such a structure would most probably soon collapse, leading to a major crisis that would threaten peace in the area. I am certain that considerations of this nature are not alien to those who provide ideas for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

56. In this context, allow me to refer to the report of the Secretary-General in document S/17657/Add.1, dated 9 December 1985, which we read with the attention it deserves, particularly its paragraph 10. I should like to point out that, as it seems to us, any agreement which would not explicitly provide for the major question of the withdrawal of the Turkish army before any transitional machinery is set up would not only turn the whole initiative into an exercise in futility; it would also strengthen the position of the aggressor in Cyprus. Obviously, the United Nations cannot have such an intention.

57. As far as the constitutional aspects of the Cyprus question are concerned, this is not a problem in which Greece is involved. I shall confine myself to saying simply that, in our view, any solution should provide for a structure of the State in full conformity with the universally accepted democratic principles, that it should not ignore the element of the composition of the population and that it should be functional, in order that greater tragedies may be averted in the future.

58. The Greek Government has consistently supported and continues to support the initiative of the Secretary-General. We deeply appreciate his untiring efforts and his dedication in carrying out a highly difficult mission. We sincerely wish that he will be able, through the procedure he has initiated. to bridge the gap between the positions of the two sides. However, in view of the extremely important concessions made by President Kyprianou—which may have gone even beyond the safety limit for the Greek Cypriot community and the State of Cyprus—this is the time for Turkey, we believe, to take a decisive step.

59. It is well known to the Council that we are already, by too many years, late in our efforts to restore the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, which finds itself *de facto* split in two. It is high time for a solution which will enable the Cypriot people in their entirety, irrespective of their religious or national affiliations—all of them: Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Latins, Maronites—to enjoy the benefits of peace: freedom and prosperity.

60. In concluding, I should like to express our deep appreciation to Major-General Greindl and the officers and men of the Force, as well as to the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General. They have performed their duties with dedication and in an impeccable manner, and we are grateful to them. Our particular thanks are also addressed to all the friendly countries that for many years have been contributing with troops and funds, thus making possible the continuing and most valuable presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus.

61. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker on my list is Mr. Özer Koray, to whom the Council has extended an invitation in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

62. Mr. KORAY: Allow me to thank you, Mr. President, and through you, all the distinguished members of the Council for granting me the opportunity to participate in the deliberations on the extension of the stay of UNFICYP in Cyprus for a period of six months.

63. The Turkish Cypriot side values very highly opportunities that enable it to air its views on the question of Cyprus, for such opportunities are few and far between. This inequitable distribution, between the two sides in Cyprus, of the right to be heard and to present one's case lies today at the heart of the failure to bring about a negotiated solution to the issues between the two peoples in Cyprus. The sooner this fact is perceived by the international community, the better will be the prospects of bringing these issues to a mutually acceptable, satisfactory conclusion. In the absence of such a perception, the Greek Cypriot side will be more than happy to prolong the issue and thus keep on monopolizing the title of "Government of Cyprus", which it contrived to usurp 22 years ago, in 1963.

64. It is an irony which never ceases to astonish the Turkish Cypriot side that the representative of the side which for years tried by all the means at its disposal to destroy the bicommunal independence of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus and to turn it into a colony of Greece has come, by default and with the connivance of others, to speak for the Republic of Cyprus and claims to represent the whole of its population, while by contrast the repre-

sentative of the side whose selfless resistance and courageous struggle gave birth to that Republic and prevented its colonization has come today to speak before this body under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. For us this is a very irksome and unjust state of affairs, without a single shred of constitutionality, which must be corrected if the way to a negotiated solution is to be opened.

65. I would hazard the guess that, despite the rule under which I have been invited to address the Council today, everybody present in this Chamber, including Mr. Moushoutas, silently acknowledges the fact that Mr. Moushoutas and I, barring our disguises, are in reality speaking as the representatives of our respective sides or peoples—no more, no less. The only difference, then, is the guise in which the Greek Cypriot side has been allowed to masquerade since 1963, the fateful year of the Greek Cypriot coup against the bicommunal Government of Cyprus.

66. To those who cannot bear the voice and presence in this building of a few Turkish Cypriots, we promise one thing only: the righteous voice of the Turkish people of Cyprus will grow ever stronger; we shall not be silenced, nor shall our presence be removed by trickery.

67. We have just witnessed a desperate attempt by Mr. Moushoutas to rewrite history, an unquestionably trying task by any yardstick. He is not alone in failing dismally in this, for his predecessors have tried and failed before him. He can, if he wishes, find solace in that fact. Yet this may—and we hope it will—open the eyes of the Greek Cypriot side and help it see that its customary role of profusely disseminating falsehoods and malicious allegations against the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in international forums will no longer pay dividends, because it has been stretched and exploited to its ultimate limits for so long—a full 22 years, to be precise.

68. Year after year this illegal entity, in the guise of an aggrieved party, has trotted round the globe repeating its worn-out, hackneyed arguments and trumped-up charges against the Turkish people of Cyprus, whom it has persecuted for so long but failed to enslave, and against Turkey, whose timely intervention caught it red-handed and put a stop to its abominable crimes against the Turkish Cypriots and the island of Cyprus. Today we have heard more of the same, and we deem it to be not worthy of response. Suffice it to say that those of us who wish to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful solution of the issues between the two sides in Cyprus should do all we can to bring an end to this dismal performance, replete with Byzantine antics.

69. The Greek Cypriot leadership should be made to understand once and for all that the time has come for it to make the crucial choice between, on the one hand, the Secretary-General's efforts and initiatives within the context of his mission of good offices in pursuance of Security Council resolution 367 (1975), and, on the other, the continuation of its tendentious activities in international forums, falsely portraying its illegal administration as the Government of Cyprus, capable of representing and speaking for both sides in Cyprus. In other words, the choice is between peace through negotiations on an equal footing with the elected representatives of the Turkish people of Cyprus and the constant pursuit of unrealistic, one-sided, condemnatory resolutions harmful to peace and reconciliation.

70. Does the recent behaviour and attitude of the Greek Cypriot leadership provide any hope for the future? The answer, unfortunately, is no. Having rejected the 27 November 1984 draft agreement—which was the result of four months of high-level proximity talks between the two sides—at the summit meeting of 17 January 1985, convened at the behest of Mr. Papandreou, the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Kyprianou, and his administration displayed no feelings of regret in the succeeding months. Even the continuing initiative and efforts of the Secretary-General to arrive at a new document which would be acceptable to both sides have not sufficed to make the Greek Cypriot leaders desist from further internationalization and exploitation of the conflict in the absence of the legitimate representatives of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

71. The resolution of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Luanda from 4 to 7 September 1985, which was adopted at the instigation of the Greek Cypriot side and in the absence of the legitimate representatives of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, is a prime example of the unchanging Greek Cypriot policy of making use of unrealistic, irrelevant resolutions extracted from international forums to achieve on paper, at least, what they could not achieve on the ground by force of arms—that is, the transformation of the island of Cyprus into a place where the Turkish Cypriots will not be allowed to stand upright, much less to rule. After Luanda, the scene moved to the Bahamas, to the Commonwealth Conference held from 16 to 22 October 1985. There we witnessed a repeat performance.

72. The Greek Cypriot side took those steps consciously and in full knowledge of their possible negative repercussions on the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General to open the way to the result-oriented dialogue which had been blocked by Mr. Kyprianou at the 17 January summit.

73. The Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus cannot, with all its good will, ignore, forgive or appraise lightly the actions of the other side or the end product of such actions, for those resolutions have all the ingredients that could signal the end of the initiatives of the Secretary-General, or at least render them meaningless. We believe that the Secretary-General himself is apprehensive about the effects of such actions and resolutions on his initiatives, knowing of course that the content of those resolutions runs counter to, and more often than not rejects, the various agreements concluded between the two sides in Cyprus under the aegis of the United Nations, on the basis of which the Secretary-General is mounting his initiatives. Our side's evaluation of the real intentions of the Greek and Greek Cypriot camp is being vindicated by these actions; that camp has not yet abandoned its old habit of viewing Cyprus as a Greek island, let alone accepted us as equal partners in a bizonal, bicommunal federal republic.

74. In order the better to understand the Greek Cypriot leadership's behaviour and to place it in the right perspective, we would be well advised to refer to the speech made on 7 October 1985 by the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Papandreou, to his party's parliamentary group. On that occasion Mr. Papandreou said, *inter alia*:

> "For a long time there have been initiatives within the context of the mission of good offices of Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar. I must point out that those initiatives are never in accordance with the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and declarations . . .
>
> "Those initiatives consist of Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar's attempts to find a negotiated solution between the two communities. I say 'two communities' on purpose, because the mediation attempts have created such an atmosphere . . . For us, the Cyprus problem has always been and remains an international issue. It is not a dispute between two communities."

Mr. Papandreou then goes on to complain about his opposition and third parties blaming him and the Greek Cypriot side for lack of progress in the negotiations and contacts and adds, "These constant accusations are the reason for Cyprus remaining and acting within the framework of Cuéllar's initiatives".

75. That lucid exposé by Mr. Papandreou tells it all. It explains with clarity why intercommunal talks and the initiatives and efforts of the Secretary-General have not succeeded. It confesses that the Greek and Greek Cypriot side has all along been paying only lip-service to the intercommunal negotiations and to the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. And it contains the explanation for Mr. Kyprianou's rejection of the 27 November draft agreement. I believe some members will agree with me in concluding that for the Greek and Greek Cypriot side perpetuation of the conflict is an end in itself.

76. Despite all this, the Turkish people of Cyprus and its elected leadership, displaying extreme patience, preserved their faith in the initiative of the Secretary-General and continued in this period to give it full support and co-operation. Notwithstanding the almost overwhelming pressure not to do so, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus kept open its channels of communication with Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, with a view to helping him advance his initiative after the setback of 17 January suffered at the hands of Mr. Kyprianou.

77. As a result of those contacts, the Secretary-General invited President Denktaş to further consultations in New York on 11 and 12 September 1985. Two days of sincere talks encouraged the Secretary-General to release the following statement:

> "The Secretary-General has had most useful talks with His Excellency Mr. Denktaş. These talks will be helpful to him in assessing the present situation and in deciding upon the next step to be taken by the Secretary-General in the near future. The Secretary-General will continue to be in touch with both sides."

78. The Turkish Cypriot side then responded positively to an invitation by the Secretary-General to further consultations at a technical level in London on 18 and 19 November. Those consultations, too, were found useful by the Secretary-General. Further contacts are anticipated.

79. The Turkish people of Cyprus, confident of the justice of its struggle and totally committed to a peaceful solution of its differences with the Greek Cypriot side, will continue, as before, to extend to the Secretary-General its full and ungrudging co-operation in his efforts within the context of his mission of good offices.

80. The Government and people of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus know that their State has legally, constitutionally and morally a sound basis and believe that it can be used as a starting point for a return to legality and legitimacy in the whole of Cyprus. Only in this way can the illegality and illegitimacy that have pervaded Cyprus for 22 years be removed.

81. We invite the Greek Cypriot leadership to take a step back at this late hour from the edge of the precipice and see that its interest, too, lies in reconciling its differences with the Turkish Cypriot side. That reconciliation can be achieved without undue sacrifices on its part, because all its ingredients and elements are found in the various agreements which the two sides have already made over the years. It need only respect and implement the agreements it has made with us. Acceptance of this path by the Greek Cypriot leadership will, we are sure, lead us to the establishment of a bicommunal, bi-zonal federal republic, guaranteeing equal political status and the legitimate rights and aspirations of both sides in Cyprus.

82. The Turkish guarantee, which has proved so effective in bringing the Turkish Cypriot people and the island of Cyprus back from the brink of destruction and colonization, is the only element which will safeguard the workability and durability of such a settlement. We cannot forgo this guarantee, and the Greek Cypriot side cannot reasonably oppose it, unless it harbours ill intentions for the future.

83. Rejection of the guarantee or attempts to circumvent it by new-fangled means destroy the chances of success in reconciling the differences between the two sides in Cyprus. This attitude, together with the pre-condition of the withdrawal of all the Turkish troops before a solution is found in Cyprus, serves only those whose interests are juxtaposed with the perpetuation of the conflict and anti-Turkish enmity. It only serves the self-interest of Prime Minister Papandreou, who, in a speech to his Parliament on 6 December, only two days before the Greek Cypriot elections in the south, served the world with another clear notice of his determination to hamper all efforts towards a negotiated, satisfactory solution of the conflict in Cyprus.

84. In that speech Mr. Papandreou, *inter alia*, warned the Greek Cypriot community against a *rapprochement* with the Turkish Cypriot side through negotiations within the context of the Secretary-General's mission of good of-

fices, which, in a previous speech I have already quoted, he had said he rejected. He also gave a stern warning to the Greek Cypriot community that he would have no qualms about interfering in its internal affairs. He took pains to influence the outcome of the Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections in favour of Mr. Kyprianou and the rejectionist front. The election results show that he was clearly successful in this regard. As the dust settles in south Cyprus, we wonder whether Mr. Kyprianou and the other beneficiaries will ever be allowed to forget the help they received from this indiscreet tirade by Mr. Papandreou.

85. The crucial question which is being pondered is whether the Secretary-General—with so many unwarranted broadsides directed at his initiatives by Mr. Papandreou, applauded by the present Greek Cypriot leadership—will be able to continue with his initiatives. The international press clearly sees the results as a setback.

86. Turning now to the resolution just adopted, I wish to stress the following points.

87. The Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus finds itself once again in the position of rejecting the resolution *in toto*. While we do not doubt the Council's sincerity in desiring an amicable solution to the problems between the two sides in Cyprus, we believe that the resolution will not help bridge the gap between the parties to the conflict. On the contrary, in the light of the foregoing, it will increase the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot side, seeing that its pretence is once again connived at by the international community. This will almost certainly be the result of the reference to "Government of Cyprus" in the resolution.

88. The administration to which the resolution refers as the "Government of Cyprus" is nothing more than an illegal, usurping entity, which by hook or by crook and by default has, as I have stated before, managed to conceal its evil character behind the title of "Government of Cyprus". Yes, there was once a legitimate Government of Cyprus, constitutionally, legally and morally equipped to represent the whole of Cyprus, but that Government, some may remember, was toppled by force of arms by its Greek Cypriot wing, which then ejected the Turkish Cypriots from all the organs of that Government. Thus the Government of Cyprus, as decreed by the now defunct 1960 Constitution, ceased to exist and the 1960 Constitution was also shelved. Those of us who are inclined to look for *faits accomplis* in Cyprus would do well to remember and look into this case, because it is the only *fait accompli* which we know to have taken place in Cyprus and it is a *fait accompli par excellence*, to which the Turkish people of Cyprus has not succumbed and never shall.

89. Feather-bedding of this illegal entity by third parties may give it an edge in its international and bilateral dealings, but at the end of the day the decisive factor is our righteous non-recognition of it. Let me stress once again that unless that usurped seat is relieved of its burden there will not be much use in hoping that the Greek Cypriot leadership will engage in a serious dialogue with its counterpart, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, in order to find solutions to our remaining differences.

90. Similarly, the reference in the fourth preambular paragraph to "other relevant resolutions" is unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side—since the Turkish Cypriot side has either rejected *in toto* or accepted subject to reservations the resolutions in question.

91. Concerning the reference in paragraph 2 to the "mission of good offices" of the Secretary-General, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would like to state that it understands that mission to be emanating from Security Council resolution 367 (1975), in which case my Government pledges its full support to it. As before, we shall be ready and willing to co-operate fully with any initiative the Secretary-General may wish to undertake within the context of his mission of good offices.

92. In paragraph 3, a reference is made to the "present mandate" of UNFICYP. As the Secretary-General himself states in paragraph 7 of his report to the Council [*S/17657*] this mandate "was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities" and as such, after 21 years, the mandate in question is not compatible with the radically changed conditions and circumstances of today. We believe, therefore, that a reappraisal of UNFICYP's mandate is long overdue and necessary.

93. Despite its unavoidable rejection *in toto* of the present resolution for the reasons stated above, the Turkish Cypriot side is nevertheless favourably disposed to accept the presence of UNFICYP on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the same basis as that stated in June 1985. Thus our position continues to be that the principle, the scope, the modalities and the procedures of co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNFICYP shall be based only on decisions which shall be taken solely by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

94. We earnestly hope that Governments contributing troops will display a neutral stance in the dispute between the two peoples. I do not wish to go into the details of the matter, but I can only say that the Secretary-General has already been informed of the issue. We shall keep this matter under review in the light of some recent developments which have caused serious misgivings.

95. Before concluding, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity once again to convey to Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar my Government's profound appreciation and thanks for his untiring efforts within the context of his mission of good offices and for the balanced and egalitarian way in which he pursues his contacts with both sides in Cyprus. Our gratitude is his due. Our sincere thanks and appreciation go to Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, who in his long years of invaluable services to the United Nations has earned the respect of all the parties he has had to deal with. We in Northern Cyprus respect him very much and wish him well in his future endeavours. Our appreciation

and thanks go also to the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. James Holger, to Major-General Guenther Greindl, UNFICYP Commander, and the officers and the men under his command for their understanding and the efficient way in which they carried out their duties during this period. We wish also to thank the members of the Secretariat dealing with the Cyprus issue. We commend Mr. Gustave Feissel and Mr. Giandomenico Picco for their dedication in discharging their responsibilities. Lastly, I take this opportunity to wish Mr. Marrack Goulding every success in his new exalted post.

96. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

97. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): I am grateful to you, Sir, and the other members of the Council for granting me this opportunity of making a statement. I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of December. I am confident that your experience and wisdom will be invaluable in guiding the deliberations of the Council to constructive results. May I also pay a warm tribute to Mr. Richard Woolcott, who presided over the Council with distinction and diligence in November.

98. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus will soon be entering its twenty-second year of existence. The Turkish Cypriots fortunately no longer face the tragic situation which prompted the creation and the stationing of the Force in the island during the dark days of 1964. UNFICYP's continued presence after 21 years has to be viewed in the light of the radically changed circumstances in the island and in the context of its role in support of peace-making efforts. Because of this role in particular, we would have wished this resolution on UNFICYP to have a content enjoying the support of all the directly interested parties.

99. I do not need to repeat here our fundamental objections to the contents of the resolution just adopted by the Council. They are well known by the members of the Council and continue to remain valid. Mr. Özer Koray has reaffirmed the position of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the present resolution and on the modalities of UNFICYP's presence in Northern Cyprus. I only wish to reconfirm the Turkish Government's complete agreement with this position.

100. We understand, of course, the wish of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to keep under constant review its position on the presence of UNFICYP, in particular in the light of recent developments which might impair the impartiality of some troop-contributing countries.

101. I should like to thank the Secretary-General for his present report, which reflects the continuing efforts he is deploying in the framework of his mission of good offices for a peaceful solution to the long-standing problems between the two sides in the island. The Turkish Government has consistently supported and encouraged the Secretary-General in his mission, and we are grateful to him for pursuing his good offices. We shall certainly continue to play a constructive role in support of an agreed settlement between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots—the two peoples of Cyprus who have to reconcile their differences through negotiations in a manner which satisfies the legitimate concerns and interests of both sides on the basis of political equality.

102. I do not wish to go into the substance of the matter at this stage since the members of the Council have been kept informed of the efforts begun by the Secretary-General in August 1984, which culminated in the joint high-level meeting of 17 January 1985. The unfortunate conclusion of that meeting has unavoidably continued to influence subsequent developments.

103. As the Secretary-General notes in his report, Turkish Cypriot views were communicated to him extensively on 8 August 1985 by President Denktaş, who has subsequently met the Secretary-General in New York on 12 and 13 September. The Secretary-General remarked that he would be in touch with both sides with regard to the next step he would take. At the suggestion of the Secretary-General, talks were held at the technical level between the Turkish Cypriot negotiator and his advisers and the Secretary-General's staff in London in November. The Secretary-General had also similar talks with the Greek Cypriot side. We hope that these discussions will enable the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices with a greater chance of success. I must say, however, that certain recent developments and statements of Greek Cypriot and Greek leaders cannot be reconciled with a genuine desire to contribute to a negotiated settlement.

104. In October, Prime Minister Papandreou, speaking before the parliamentary group of PASOK, expressed his opposition to the content and scope of the Secretary-General's efforts on Cyprus. Then the Secretary-General was obliged to remind Mr. Papandreou of the basis of his mission of good offices, as well as of the statement by the President of the Security Council calling upon all parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General.

105. More recently, Mr. Papandreou made a statement in the Parliament which is contrary to the basic premises on which the Secretary-General's efforts are based. That statement came on 6 December, just before the Greek Cypriot elections held on 8 December. I do not wish to elaborate on this timing, but its purpose was clearly diagnosed in the international press. Let me just quote here a paragraph from *The New York Times* of 9 December about the consequences of the important support Mr. Kyprianou received from Mr. Papandreou:

> "The result of this competition of patriotic claims, according to diplomats, has been to move the entire Greek Cypriot political spectrum to less conciliatory attitudes. This is believed to make even less promising Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts to bring Mr. Kyprianou and Rauf Denktaş, the unchallenged leader of the Turkish community, back to New York for another attempt at ending the 11-year stalemate."

106. The latest statement by Mr. Papandreou cannot be characterized as anything but a very rigid stand against any negotiated settlement. It is significant that the Greek opposition leader stated in the Parliament that he radically disagreed with Mr. Papandreou's views on the Cyprus problem, adding that there were possibilities for a just settlement of the issue in the context of the Secretary-General's initiative. The opposition leader spoke again today and accused Mr. Papandreou of undermining the efforts of the Secretary-General. Obviously, Mr. Kyprianou fully supports Mr. Papandreou. He expressed his gratification at the Greek Prime Minister's position.

107. In the circumstances, it is clear that progress can be made only if the Greek Cypriots and Greek leaders change their basic positions and come to the conclusion that they really want a negotiated agreement. If they compete with each other in making militant speeches totally irrelevant to the reality of the situation and the wish of the international community, they will not even fool their own public opinion, as evidenced by the reactions in Greece and southern Cyprus.

108. It is incumbent upon Turkey and Greece to do their utmost to facilitate and encourage an agreement between the two sides in Cyprus through the good offices mission of the Secretary-General. That is what Turkey is doing, and it must be clear to everybody that we shall not support any other negotiating process. If Greece is unhappy with the Secretary-General's mission and the prospect of a settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the principles agreed upon by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, it should then at least refrain from interfering in a negative and destructive manner. But at present the Greek Government is actively intervening in the negotiating process, with the obvious objective of disrupting it. There are even from time to time ominous signs of an intent to broaden this intervention to the military field. At this stage, we thought it would be useful to call the attention of the Security Council to the dangers involved in present Greek policies.

109. Indeed, the statement of the representative of Greece has confirmed our misgivings. It has made clear that Mr. Papandreou wishes to impose the terms of a settlement in Cyprus. Mr. Dountas has, in fact, presented us with a detailed scenario made in Athens. It is obvious that Mr. Papandreou considers that he has the right to veto an agreement between the two negotiating parties that is not to his liking. This statement by Mr. Dountas is the most convincing proof that the main obstacle today to a negotiated agreement between the two Cypriot sides is Greece. Greece is the cause of the tragedy in Cyprus; Mr. Papandreou should not aggravate it further.

110. There was a torrent of vicious and unfounded allegations in the statement by Mr. Moushoutas. It is clear that he made a special effort to surpass even his previous statements in this regard. Does he really believe that such intense rhetoric will distract the attention of the Security Council from the real question? Is the Greek Cypriot Administration willing to negotiate an agreement within the framework proposed by the Secretary-General? If not, the abundant verbiage to which we have been exposed is just a waste of time.

111. I shall therefore not waste more of the Council's time by replying to Mr. Moushoutas. Let me just clarify one point. The draft agreement submitted by the Secretary-General in January 1985 foresaw negotiations on a timetable for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces—not only Turkish forces. The Turkish Cypriots accepted this draft agreement, but the Greek Cypriots rejected it. Therefore, whatever has been said here about the withdrawal of Turkish forces is pure demagoguery.

112. In conclusion, I wish to express again our thanks to the Secretary-General and to assure him of my Government's full support for his mission of good offices. We hope his efforts within this framework will be successful. I should like to express our appreciation to Major-General Guenther Greindl, Commander of UNFICYP, and his staff. I should like also to thank Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, as well as the Secretariat members dealing with Cyprus here in New York. They all enjoy the confidence of the Turkish side, and this has very particular importance in the context of this problem.

113. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Cyprus has asked to be allowed to make a statement, and I now call on him.

114. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Unlike the representative of Turkey, I should like to take a few minutes of the Council's time in order to set the record straight and defend my Government and people. I do so in the hope that if certain facts are made abundantly clear to the Council and the problem we are facing is seen in its right perspective, a positive contribution will be made to the efforts under way to achieve a just and lasting solution.

115. As I have done at previous meetings of the Security Council, I shall address my remarks only to the representative of Turkey. It is not my intention to disregard—nor do I believe the members of this body will disregard—the statement of the individual who was allowed to speak in his personal capacity under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure—and then proceeded only to abuse that right, in order to complement the voice of the occupying Power. In spite of that statement by him, I feel that Turkey is the principal and that Turkey made both statements; for he who does things through surrogates actually does them himself.

116. I would only say that if Mr. Koray sheds the guise of the surrogate, one sees that he is in reality a Cypriot. I sincerely consider him as such—a member of a community which is an inseparable part of our people.

117. The representative of Turkey, through Mr. Koray and in his own statement, went to some length to play down the importance of the issue of the withdrawal of the occupation troops. His motive is obvious. Take away the forces of occupation, allow the Cypriot people to move freely all over their country, deprive Turkey of any pretext on which to allege grounds to be present for an invasion, and the whole Turkish thesis of presenting their Attila as a peacemaker falls flat on its face.

118. The Council will no doubt appreciate that Turkey and its few apologists could not succeed in their diversionary tactics. They could not impress upon the Council and the world at large their fallacious notion that there is no need to pay attention to little details such as the withdrawal of the Turkish forces of occupation and the application to Cyprus of the minimum prerequisite for every State structure, whether federal or unitary. I consider the three freedoms to be a minimum: freedom of citizens to move about, freedom to settle and freedom to own property, especially if they were deprived of such properties by some invaders, as I said in my statement, and settlers from Turkey.

119. But if I may be allowed to take a more sober view towards these Turkish assertions, I would strongly submit that Ankara's spokesmen are out of order and in utter contempt of the Security Council whenever they present themselves in the Council, making propositions and propagating partition, secession, perpetuation of the military occupation and the prevention or curtailment of basic human rights to the people of Cyprus as a whole.

120. The Turkish side complains about the Luanda declaration and the Commonwealth declaration. They say they are one-sided and they are therefore not bound by them. May I remind the Council that Turkey voted for resolution 3212 (XXIX) in the General Assembly. That resolution, as may be recalled, was later endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974) and made mandatory. Does the representative of Turkey consider that that has nothing to do with reality? Having voted for that resolution, what did Turkey do to implement it? Have the Turkish occupation troops withdrawn, as provided for in the resolution? Has the demand for respect for the sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus been met? Have the refugees been allowed to return to their homes and lands in safety, as is provided for in the resolution? Those are the points to which the representative of Turkey should address himself.

121. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Greece.

122. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I should like to refer to a few of the statements and remarks made by Mr. Türkmen.

123. My distinguished colleague, referring to the statements of Prime Minister Papandreou, the gist of which is that the Turkish army should withdraw from Cyprus before any transitional Government is set up—that is the gist of all the statements of Prime Minister Papandreou—Mr. Türkmen maintained that those statements are irreconcilable with the initiative of the Secretary-General, that those statements are against a negotiated settlement. He also said that those statements were undermining—perhaps I am not using the exact words, but I am giving the gist—the initiative of the Secretary-General.

124. Allow me to attempt to put the record straight. We are not against the initiative of the Secretary-General. A few moments ago I had the opportunity to reiterate our position with regard to the initiative. I said quite clearly, I dare say unequivocally, that the Greek Government "has consistently supported and continues to support the initiative of the Secretary-General", and I went on to say that we "appreciate his untiring efforts and his dedication in carrying out a highly difficult mission". And I concluded that part by saying that we sincerely hoped he would be able through the procedure he has initiated to bridge the gap between the positions of the sides. That is what I said, and it does not conform with what Mr. Türkmen maintains I said.

125. But apart from that I should like to make it clear that not only do we support the Secretary-General's initiative; we have also made a great many positive contributions within the framework of numerous contacts in order to see that initiative succeed. But what we are against—and I want to be extremely emphatic on this—is the continuation of the occupation of Cyprus by Turkish troops. In this we are both rigid and unswerving.

126. And I should like to ask Mr. Türkmen why he construes the statement that we want to see the occupation troops withdrawn from Cyprus as being irreconcilable with the initiative of the Secretary-General. Does he believe that the Secretary-General is in favour of continuation of the occupation, or perhaps, which is most probable, does he wish to give us a clear hint that the Turkish troops will not withdraw from Cyprus?

127. There is another point I should like to touch on very briefly. Mr. Koray said that the Prime Minister of Greece, in one of his recent statements to the Parliament, had warned the Greek Cypriots against any *rapprochement* between the two communities. That is absolutely incorrect. On no occasion has the Prime Minister said or even hinted that he is against *rapprochement* between the two communities. The only explanation I can find is that perhaps Mr. Koray did not have time to read the statement of Mr. Papandreou and he found it convenient to draft a statement of the Prime Minister to match his own purposes.

128. I am a bit hesitant to refer to one of the remarks made by Mr. Türkmen. He referred to a statement by the leader of the Greek opposition criticizing the Prime Minister. In Greece, as in many other countries, very often the opposition criticizes the Government. I am really sorry that the situation in Turkey does not permit me to quote from statements of the Turkish opposition.

129. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

130. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): First of all I wish to assure Mr. Dountas that I am going to send him some statements from opposition leaders in Turkey. We accept that there is democracy in Greece. Democracy in Greece came after the tragedy Cyprus underwent in 1974, when the Greek dictatorship tried to invade the island. It was thanks to the Turkish intervention and the consequences of that intervention—the uproar in Greek public opinion, the reaction of the Greek people—that brought democracy to Greece. I think it is not, therefore, very proper for

Mr. Dountas to try to intimate that there is no democracy in Turkey. There is democracy today both in Turkey and in Greece.

131. Now, perhaps one reason why, in Turkey, the opposition leader is not criticizing the policy of the Turkish Government on Cyprus is that the Turkish Government's policy in that respect is very clear. We just support the good offices mission of the Secretary-General. We do not enter into the substance of the matter. We do not want to influence in any negative manner the ongoing negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

132. Mr. Dountas says that he sees nothing in what Mr. Papandreou has said that is against the initiative of the Secretary-General, that he has paid his tribute to the Secretary-General. I did not say that he has not paid compliments to the Secretary-General. What I said is that Prime Minister Papandreou, by taking the positions that he has taken, is prejudging the outcome of the negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus. Mr. Dountas himself provided us with a detailed agreement proposed by Mr. Papandreou, but Mr. Papandreou and the Greek Government are not direct negotiators. The negotiators are, on the one hand, the Greek Cypriots and, on the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots.

133. Mr. Moushoutas spoke at length about resolution 3212 (XXIX) and other United Nations resolutions and of the fact that Turkey has not implemented them, and he said that all those resolutions were relevant to our discussion here today. They are not. He has only to read the resolution just adopted. The only operative paragraph with regard to negotiations, paragraph 2, requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 31 May 1986. I do not see any reference there to other resolutions. His statement, therefore, was totally irrelevant.

134. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Greece has asked to make a statement, and I call upon him to do so.

135. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): It is with reluctance that I have asked to speak again. I should like to say that by quoting what my Prime Minister said and in what I said I am not prejudging the outcome of the negotiations. Greece—and I made this clear at the very outset of my statement—in the capacity of guarantor of the Republic of Cyprus, which means in the same capacity as Turkey, felt that it had the right and the duty to make clear its position with regard to this very important international aspect of the Cyprus problem and to say to all the members of the Council that one of the fundamental positions of Greece with regard to the solution of the Cyprus problem is the withdrawal of the Turkish army. We did not impose that solution on the Secretary-General; we did not impose that position on anybody. We simply stated our position, as it is our inalienable right to do.

136. As to the gratitude we owe to the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish army, because through that invasion democracy was restored in Greece—I would assure Mr. Türkmen that in the list of the benefactors of democracy, after the name of Pericles we will inscribe the name of the Turkish army.

137. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Cyprus has asked to make a statement, and I now call upon him.

138. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Withdrawal of foreign troops—as a matter of fact, occupation troops, as they are described in relevant United Nations resolutions—is not prejudging the outcome of the negotiations. This is a solemn demand in solemn decisions of this body, and Turkey has not implemented those resolutions. We are here to renew the mandate of UNFICYP. The question is, why is UNFICYP there? UNFICYP is there because Turkey again did not comply with decisions and resolutions of this body. I would also invite the attention of the representative of Turkey to the resolution just adopted, and specifically to the paragraph that states: "Reaffirming the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) and other relevant resolutions".

139. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Before calling upon the representative of Turkey, who has asked to make a statement, I would like to appeal to the various representatives. We have listened to you most attentively. Like my colleagues here, I am convinced that it would be pointless to prolong this debate. It is not today, in hearing the different views with which we are very familiar, that we will be able to resolve the problem.

140. I call upon the representative of Turkey.

141. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): First of all, when Mr. Dountas speaks of the Turkish "invasion" and the debt owed to the Turkish army, he forgets one thing. He forgets that in 1974 the late Archbishop Makarios came to the Council and said that he was facing, not a Turkish invasion, but a Greek invasion. This is in the records of the Security Council for its 1780th meeting. What happened in 1974 was a Turkish intervention within the framework of the Treaty of Guarantee which now Mr. Dountas says gives Greece the right to dictate the terms of a settlement in Cyprus.

142. I also wish on this occasion to point out a contradiction in Greece's position. On the one hand, it rejects the Treaty of Guarantee and it says it does not want to become a party to a treaty of guarantee in the future, and, on the other hand, they take advantage of it today. They say that as a guaranteeing Power they have the right to interfere in the negotiating process in Cyprus. We are not doing that.

143. As far as Pericles is concerned, I must say that we all owe a debt to Pericles. But Greece itself has not been very faithful to Pericles, and we would therefore all do very well to be respectful to Pericles, but also to render to Caesar what is due to Caesar—and certainly Greece owes

to the Turkish intervention in Cyprus after the Greek invasion of Cyprus a debt of gratitude for its own democracy.

144. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In spite of my appeal the representative of Greece wishes to make a statement, and I therefore call upon him.

145. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I immensely appreciate the Council's generosity. I would like to say that I did not say I was going to dictate a solution. Again, I repeat that what I said is that we wanted to make our position clear. As to the Treaty of Guarantee, we never said we were not a guaranteeing Power. What we said is that we do not recognize that the Treaty of Guarantee gives the right of military intervention in Cyprus.

146. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Cyprus wishes to make a statement, and I now call upon him.

147. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): If the Treaty of Guarantee had given such a right, it would have been against the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. As we all know, Article 103 does not allow for such contradiction.

148. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus completed the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

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